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A MOVEMENT OVERLOOKED 
Margaret A. Mahoney† 
Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice.  By Ian F. Haney 
López.  Harvard University Press, 2003.  324 pages.  $27.951 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
East Los Angeles (L.A.) is a working-class community tending 
to include many poor, young, and uneducated residents.  In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, more than seventy-five percent of the 
student body at the four East L.A. public high schools was Mexican.  
During this time-frame, only about one-half of the Mexican 
students who entered the L.A. public school system finished high 
school.2  After East L.A. residents found little success in their 
attempts to reform the public school system during the 1950s, they 
confronted schools in the 1960s that they believed to be 
responsible for the inequitable educational treatment of Mexican 
students.3  Ian F. Haney Lopez uses an interesting and well-
researched discussion of these civil rights struggles faced by 
Mexicans in the late 1960s and 1970s to introduce his theory of 
race. 
López articulates three goals for his book: (1) to describe the 
evolution of the Chicano movement in East L.A. during the 1960s 
and 1970s, (2) “to illustrate how racial thinking leads to and stems 
from legal violence,” and (3) “to offer a general theory of race as 
common sense” to help understand the Chicano movement and 
 
       †   Margaret A. Mahoney is a staff attorney with the Office of the Monitor, a 
court-appointed neutral in a civil rights class action settlement. Mahoney is also an 
adjunct professor at William Mitchell College of Law, where she teaches appellate 
advocacy. After graduating cum laude from William Mitchell College of Law in 
2001, she spent one year clerking for then-Judge Sam Hanson at the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals. 
 1. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 
(2003).  This book is now available in paperback format. 
 2. Id. at 16-17. 
 3. Id. at 18. 
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current racial dynamics.4  While the reader is often confused 
because López fails to provide a roadmap of his discussion,5 López 
does divide his discussion into three parts that generally 
correspond with these three goals.  This Review will discuss the 
topics López covers in an effort to show how he addresses these 
goals. 
II.  THE SCHOOL PROTESTS AND RESPONSES 
In Part One, López indicates that he is attempting “to explore 
efforts by the Mexican community to grapple with racism and, 
more importantly, with the nature of their racial identity.”6  To do 
this, López describes the legal and racial battles involved in two 
separate criminal prosecutions of multiple Chicano activists, 
stemming from protests that occurred in 1968.  In this part and 
throughout Racism on Trial, López demonstrates his talent for 
providing an interesting historical narrative of this civil rights 
movement. 
First, he discusses the conditions of the educational system in 
East L.A. that led to low graduation rates and caused Mexicans to 
feel compelled to change the system.  López explains that the 
public schools in East L.A. not only suffered from poor physical 
conditions, inadequate resources, and severe overcrowding, but 
also employed a large number of white teachers who had a skewed 
view of their students and of their role as educators.7  While any 
person could make such an assertion, López’s strength is the 
manner in which he provides evidence to support his arguments.  
For instance, with respect to his assertion that the teachers were 
part of the problem because they viewed Mexican students as 
unruly and dangerous, López quotes one junior-high teacher who 
 
 4. Id. at 2. 
 5. For example, the author does not fully explain his “common sense” 
theory of racism until about halfway through Part 2 of this three-part book.  
However, he frequently mentions the basic premise of his theory earlier in the 
book, arguing that race is “accepted but barely noticed, there though not 
important, an established fact that we lack the responsibility, let alone the power, 
to change.”  Id. at vii.  López asserts that Common Sense Racism results from our 
regular reliance on, yet infrequent examination of, assumptions about race.  He 
also contends that Common Sense Racism (in contrast to intentional racism) is 
the most frequent type of racism because it “is unconsidered and reflexive, the 
product of thoughtless reliance on background ideas of race.”  Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. at vii. 
 7. Id. at 17. 
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said, “all you can do is give them seat work to keep them busy and 
keep them under control.”8  López also asserts that in addition to 
having distorted perceptions about how Mexican students would 
behave, the teachers also had biases about their Mexican students’ 
mental capabilities.  For example, in 1968, fourteen percent of 
California’s elementary and secondary students were Mexican, but 
Mexican students accounted for forty percent of students put into 
separate educational programs for the “mentally handicapped.”9 
Second, López notes the steps students took to address the 
conditions in the public schools.  Students organized groups to 
focus on educational reform and, in the early spring of 1968, 
students at the four East L.A. high schools agreed that they would 
stage mass walkouts.  A number of walkouts occurred in the high 
schools over a one-week period.10 
Third, López discusses people’s reactions to the protests.  He 
indicates that the students were not alone in their protests; a 
Mexican teacher participated in the walkouts and some individuals 
prominent in the Mexican community participated in a post-
walkout rally at a park.  While Mexican youths and adults took 
pride in their efforts, many white people, including white teachers, 
openly opined that Mexicans themselves were responsible for the 
poor conditions they faced in schools.11  López provides an excerpt 
of a letter, full of negative characterizations, from a teacher to the 
community to explain that the walkouts were just another example 
of how absenteeism and passivity were Mexican traits.12  Another 
teacher’s letter, written to ameliorate the harm done by the first 
letter, confirmed that most teachers saw Mexicans as “dumb,” 
“dirty,” smelly, and “lazy.”13  The police arrested Mexican 
protestors, including members of a group called the Brown Berets, 
which, as López explains in more detail in Part Three, was a more 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 20.  The students formed a central committee to draft a list of thirty-
six demands for educational reform that they would present in conjunction with 
the walkouts.  Before the walkouts were scheduled to occur, a school principal 
canceled one school’s senior class play and the students from that school staged an 
unplanned walkout.  This action caused students from the other schools to stage 
their walkouts earlier than planned to show solidarity for the first school.  Id. at 20-
22. 
 11. Id. at 23. 
 12. Id. at 23-24. 
 13. Id. at 24. 
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radical splinter group of a different organization that focused 
primarily on educational reform.  After a grand jury called 
witnesses, the police—in nighttime raids conducted on a Friday in 
late May 1968—arrested thirteen individuals for their role in the 
walkouts.14  These individuals, known as the East L.A. Thirteen, 
were well-educated individuals who had demonstrated their 
leadership skills both within and outside the Mexican community.15  
After the arrest of the East L.A. Thirteen, the Mexican community 
became more concerned about police brutality and political 
activism increased.  The second criminal prosecution, of the 
Biltmore Six, involved felony charges of burglary, arson, and 
conspiracy arising from activities in the spring of 1969.16  Three of 
the East L.A. Thirteen were also members of the Biltmore Six.17 
Again, the author’s strength is making what could be a dry 
history lesson into an interesting story.  López explains that Oscar 
Acosta, the lead attorney who represented the East L.A. Thirteen, 
had very little legal experience, having spent a significant amount 
of time after law school traveling and carousing with his friend 
Hunter S. Thompson.18  The East L.A. Thirteen trial was Acosta’s 
first major criminal trial, but López believes Acosta was ideal to 
handle the case because of his brilliance, passion, and 
independence, and because Acosta so readily identified with his 
clients.19 
López discusses the trials and the multiple defenses asserted in 
each case,20 including the defense that judges discriminated when 
 
 14. Id. at 26.  In addition to the unusual nighttime raids, the bail set was 
abnormally high.  The bail for these individuals was initially set at $10,000, which, 
López notes, was ten times the amount usually imposed for cases involving 
burglary or assault with a deadly weapon.  On the following Monday, the judge 
significantly reduced the bail.  Id. at 27.  Indictments against the thirteen included 
not only multiple misdemeanor counts but also felony charges for conspiring to 
commit those crimes, with possible forty-five year sentences.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 26. 
 16. Id. at 3-4.  Activists had protested at the Biltmore Hotel, where then-
Governor Reagan spoke at an educational conference that sought to address the 
needs of Mexican students.  Fires were lit on five floors but were quickly 
extinguished, no one was evacuated, and Reagan was unaware of the events until 
later.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 36. 
 18. Id. at 29. 
 19. Id. at 30-31.  López notes that Acosta established the Chicano Legal 
Defense Fund.  Id. at 31. 
 20. The criminal prosecution of the East L.A. Thirteen began in May 1968.  
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excluding Mexicans from grand jury appointments and, thus, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.  López contends that Acosta 
focused on an equal protection defense because Mexicans 
accounted for less than two percent of all grand jurors, yet they 
represented between ten and eighteen percent of the population 
in the 1960s.21  The fact that Mexicans were not represented on the 
grand jury may explain why Acosta raised an equal protection 
defense, but, despite López’s conclusion to the contrary, that fact 
does not explain why Acosta focused on that defense.  It is not until 
much later in the book that López explains that Acosta made it 
clear that he believed the purpose of the trials was more about 
educating people and advancing the Chicano movement than 
freeing the accused.22 
The author asserts that although neither case ultimately 
turned on the equal protection defense, that defense formed the 
heart of both cases and delivered a strong political message.  He 
notes that Mexicans previously were not recognized as a racial 
group and frequently were considered part of the white race.23  
Acosta called judges to testify—as part of his equal protection 
defense—so that he could show that those judges considered 
Mexicans to be a distinct group of people.  López discusses at 
length Acosta’s sometimes contradictory arguments, in which 
Acosta invoked race, but did not argue that Mexicans were a 
separate race.  Acosta instead stated that he did not know how to 
 
López indicates that Acosta raised three distinct defenses in this case: (1) there 
was insufficient evidence for the conspiracy charges, (2) the defendants’ actions 
were protected under the First Amendment, and (3) the court’s failure to appoint 
Mexicans to the indicting grand jury violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because that failure resulted from discrimination.  Id. at 
31.  López states that Acosta first primarily emphasized the First Amendment 
defense but then instead focused on the equal protection claim.  All thirteen 
defendants ultimately prevailed on First Amendment grounds.  Id. at 32.  The 
Biltmore Six case was assigned to a Mexican judge, before whom Acosta raised the 
same defenses based on the Equal Protection Clause and the composition of the 
grand jury.  Acosta was unable to assert a First Amendment defense due to the 
nature of the crimes.  López notes that the principal witness, an undercover police 
officer, was also Mexican.  Acosta tried to show that this police officer provoked 
others to light the fires in the hotel.  The judge did not accept the discrimination 
defense, but none of the defendants were convicted.  One of the six defendants 
had his charges dismissed, three defendants were acquitted at trial, and mistrial 
was declared regarding two defendants who were acquitted later.  Id. at 32, 36-39. 
 21. Id. at 32. 
 22. Id. at 174. 
 23. Id. at 32, 40, 42, 46. 
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define race, and emphasized that Mexicans formed a distinct group 
due to their descent, physical features, or group culture.  In the 
East L.A. Thirteen case, the presiding judge accepted the argument 
that Mexicans constituted a distinct class.24 
Finally, in the last chapter of Part One, López seemingly 
doubles back and provides an interesting description of the history 
of the settlement of California, the dynamic class system that 
existed at that time, how whites positioned Mexicans as an inferior 
race by making characterizations and then attributing those 
characterizations to nature, and how Mexicans became increasingly 
isolated linguistically, politically, and economically.  It is not until 
the end of the chapter and the end of Part One that López 
explains exactly how he finds this information to be significant.  He 
argues that by 1960, almost all of the residents of East L.A. were 
U.S. citizens of Mexican descent.  These residents composed a new 
generation of individuals who, because they encountered daily 
mistreatment, began questioning racial beliefs and the American 
dream, which led to the “East L.A. Thirteen” and “Biltmore Six” 
cases discussed above.25 
In this chapter, López also describes how in the 1940s, 
Mexicans began the struggle for full inclusion in U.S. society 
through assimilation.26  López indicates that by the 1950s, Mexicans 
officially were accepted as white according to the census, but that 
classification rarely afforded them any meaningful equality.27  He 
provides many examples of the difficulties Mexicans faced, but the 
most striking example is an excerpt from the transcript at the 
sentencing of a Mexican juvenile in 1969.  While the excerpt, in its 
entirety, is quite appalling, the nature of the excerpt can be 
appreciated through the following statements, made by the judge: 
You are just an animal.  You are lower than an animal.  
Even animals don’t do that . . .  I don’t know why your 
parents haven’t been able to teach you anything or train 
you.  Mexican people, after 13 years of age, [sic] it’s 
perfectly all right to go out and act like an animal. 
. . . . 
We ought to send you out of the country—send you 
 
 24. Id. at 46, 51-55. 
 25. Id. at 56-87. 
 26. Id. at 72-76. 
 27. Id. at 82. 
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back to Mexico . . . . You are lower than animals and 
haven’t the right to live in organized society-just 
miserable, lousy, rotten people.  There is nothing we can 
do with you . . . .  Maybe Hitler was right.  The animals in 
our society probably ought to be destroyed because they 
have no right to live among human beings.28 
While this final chapter seems relevant to fully understanding 
the situation in East L.A., López does not provide enough advance 
explanation regarding why he includes historical discussions such 
as these, leaving the reader guessing as to their relevance. 
III.  RACE AS COMMON SENSE 
In Part Two of the book, López presents his Common Sense 
Racism theory.  He does this in the context of a more in-depth 
discussion of Acosta’s defense that the systematic exclusion of 
Mexicans from the L.A. grand jury led to discrimination against the 
Mexican defendants.  
First, López reiterates that for Acosta to prevail on his equal 
protection defense, he had to first prove that Mexicans constituted 
an identifiable and distinct minority group, and then had to show 
bias against them.29  Again, López demonstrates his ability to make 
well-supported arguments.  He provides excerpts from the 
transcripts showing that despite the many existing guidelines for 
selecting grand jurors, the judges essentially nominated their 
friends.30  López explains that Acosta convinced the East L.A. 
Thirteen court that Mexicans were a distinct group, but Acosta was 
 
 28. Id. at 84-85.  These statements were made to a Mexican defendant 
accused of incest with his sister. 
 29. Id. at 4-5.  At one point, to show discrimination against the defendants, 
Acosta had to argue that Mexicans were a group of individuals distinct from 
“Hispanics” (the broad census category that supposedly is independent of race) or 
“Latinos.”  These two terms describe people of varying descent and backgrounds.  
Some of the groups within the Hispanic and Latino labels are considered to be 
ethnic instead of racial.  Id. at viii-ix. 
 30. Id. at 8, 94.  In the East L.A. Thirteen case, Acosta called thirty-three 
judges to the stand.  Id. at 96.  Those judges had submitted 255 nominations of 
230 individual nominees between 1959 and 1968, eighty-two percent of whom 
were personal acquaintances and another seven percent of whom were 
recommended by a friend or colleague.  Id. at 96-97.  López also provides 
information from different studies of the composition of the grand jury, including 
the observation that in “the 1960s, Mexicans counted for 1 of every 7 persons in 
Los Angeles, but only 1 of every 36 nominees and 1 of every 58 grand jurors.”  Id. 
at 100. 
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unable to show discrimination because he could not show that the 
judges intentionally excluded Mexicans from the grand jury.31  
Although Acosta argued that purposeful discrimination was not 
necessary to prevail on his defense, the court did not accept that 
argument.  Later, in an unrelated case, the Supreme Court held 
that the U.S. Constitution only prohibits intentional racism.32 
Second, López articulates his race theory.  He argues that 
discrimination is efficient, in that people make generalizations 
based on race or some other marker of group difference for traits 
that are difficult to observe, and explains that this is Common 
Sense Racism.  He applies this theory to the two Chicano cases, 
stating that it is unlikely the judges intentionally failed to nominate 
Mexicans due to racial hatred.33  Rather, it is likely that they made 
non-rational choices based on adopted routines they used to 
impose order in their personal lives.34  López distinguishes this 
behavior from conscious decision-making.  He states that if the 
judges had consciously made decisions about their nominations, 
they would have utilized a wide range of practices.  Instead, each 
judge’s process of nominating friends and acquaintances was nearly 
identical, and violated the methodology prescribed by statute, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and the California courts.35   
When making this conclusion, López explains the 
methodology of an interesting psychology experiment which 
suggested that people create their own internal “scripts.”  Relying 
on this experiment, López contends that the judges unintentionally 
ignored the instructions given for grand jury selection because they 
simply followed their own scripts.  López asserts that Common 
Sense Racism is so ingrained that to go against common sense 
would seem unnatural.36  López continues, stating that racial beliefs 
consist of characteristics (stereotypes), categories (ancestry and 
appearance), and racial properties (a culture’s understanding of 
what race is).37  Most people treat these beliefs as timeless truths 
that are a part of nature, something beyond control.   
López asserts that the judges incorporated these beliefs into 
 
 31. Id. at 91. 
 32. Id. at 106 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
 33. Id. at 107-08. 
 34. Id. at 110-11. 
 35. Id. at 112-14. 
 36. Id. at 114-15, 118. 
 37. Id. at 119. 
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their nomination process, and contends that every judge on the 
superior court was influenced by negative views of Mexican 
character and saw whites as superior, even those judges who actively 
sought to appoint minorities to promote integration.38  While the 
judges could have been influenced by negative views while trying to 
promote integration, López does not explain how his assertion that 
judges may have actively sought to appoint minorities fits with his 
earlier assertion that the judges did not engage in conscious 
decision-making.  In addition, on its face, his argument seems to 
leave a no-win situation, in that no matter what the judges did, their 
decisions would be based on negative views of minorities. 
López appears to argue, however, that if societal segregation 
were eliminated and people interacted more with people of other 
races, judges would naturally know more Mexicans and would 
appoint them to the grand jury.  He states that scripted behavior is 
spontaneous and involves little or no thought, while channeled 
behavior allows people to self-consciously reject scripts on which 
they typically rely and yet assures that they still act within a narrow 
range of alternative behavior.  He asserts that the judges would 
have considered anyone they knew to be meritorious, but, due to 
their scripted behavior, did not have access to minorities and did 
not seek them out.39  While this argument makes sense, López does 
not acknowledge that it runs counter to his earlier argument that 
every judge was elitist, even those who actively sought to appoint 
minorities. 
López argues that it is wrong to require “intent to discriminate 
[as] a predicate for racist behavior.”40  He suggests a new definition 
of racism: “action arising out of racial common sense and enforcing 
racial hierarchy.”41  He argues that under this definition, affirmative 
action is not racism because it does not have a goal of enforcing 
racial hierarchy.  In contrast, purposeful racism is “Common Sense 
 
 38. Id. at 119-22. 
 39. Id. at 123-24. 
 40. Id. at 127. 
 41. Id.  López states that he does “not attribute common sense racism to 
individual psychology.”  Rather, “group interaction, not conflicts within 
individuals, generate[s] racial common sense,” which, in turn, influences 
individual behavior.  Id. at 131.  He states that, as a result, common sense racism 
could be referred to as institutional racism.  He seems to assert that this is a novel 
racial theory because he uses the idea of institutional racism as a label for a theory 
of social behavior rather than just as a label for a problem, which is how the term 
is currently used.  Id. at 132-33. 
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Racism Plus”—Common Sense Racism and a conscious decision to 
do racial harm—a knowing decision to increase racial inequality.42  
López concludes that Mexicans found a Chicano identity, 
described in more detail in Part Three, to combat Common Sense 
Racism through reformulating basic understandings of race.43 
Third, López follows this discussion of his Common Sense 
Racism theory with a discussion in Chapter Six of Common Sense 
Racism by the police.  He again uses well-supported assertions to 
engage the reader.  As with the discussion at the end of Part One, 
López does not clearly state at the beginning of this discussion the 
purpose for which he provides this information, but concludes the 
chapter explaining how these practices may have led to the 
formation of a Chicano identity.44 
López discusses the L.A. Police Department’s (L.A.P.D.) 
deployment of forces to certain minority neighborhoods where 
studies had shown higher proportions of crime.  López argues that 
this practice resulted in police being deployed in anticipation of 
criminal conduct instead of in response to crime, which, because 
more police were in those areas to witness crime, seemingly 
confirmed the notion that minorities were more likely to commit 
crimes.  For example, Chief Parker, chief of the L.A.P.D. from 1950 
to 1966, most often used arrest statistics to defend his purportedly 
race-neutral actions.45  Arrest statistics generally are considered not 
to be very reliable, and López provides a good example to show 
why arrest statistics should be scrutinized.  He indicates that a 1972 
study showed that “in terms of major crimes, there was very little 
difference in the crime rates between the white and Mexican areas 
of Los Angeles,” but there were three to four times as many officers 
 
 42. Id. at 128.  López notes that there are three important implications of 
viewing racism this way: (1) it assumes that racism is ubiquitous, meaning that 
almost everyone practices racism; (2) it ensures that good intentions do not 
preclude a finding of racist conduct, unlike the scheme in the Chicano cases 
which required intent to discriminate; and (3) it suggests that a high level of self-
awareness and control are required to overcome the racism.  Id. at 128-29. 
 43. Id. at 130. 
 44. Id. at 134-54. 
 45. Id. at 135-39.  When discussing these practices, López quotes Chief 
Parker, who said that from “‘an ethnological point of view, Negro, Mexican and 
Anglo-Saxon are unscientific breakdowns; they are fiction.  From a police point of 
view, they are a useful fiction . . . .’”  Id. at 137.  Parker publicly asserted that 
Mexicans have a genetic disposition to be “wild.”  Id. at 138. 
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operating in East L.A. compared to the white areas of L.A.46  The 
increased police presence resulted in many more arrests in East 
L.A. for minor crimes.  More than fifty percent of these arrests were 
alcohol-related crimes, while the California Department of Public 
Health found that the level of alcoholism in East L.A. was identical 
to that in the western region.47  Thus, if the police presence had 
been more equal between the minority and non-minority areas of 
L.A., and arrests had been made for the same crimes, the arrest 
rates between these populations would have been similar.  López 
argues that Common Sense Racism based on the police officers’ 
perceptions of Mexicans led to the police more vigorously pursuing 
violations by Mexicans and that those arrests statistically supported 
the notion of Mexican criminality which, in turn, supported 
aggressive police deployment.48 
López concludes this last chapter of Part Two by printing 
excerpts from another 1972 study by Armando Morales regarding 
law enforcement policies.  Morales concluded in these studies that 
persons who identified themselves as Chicano were almost one-
third more likely to perceive police malpractice than those who 
identified themselves as Mexican-Americans because Chicanos were 
more likely to be politicized and criticize police practices.49  López 
argues that the study results likely are inaccurate because not only 
may Chicanos and Mexican-Americans have perceived police 
malpractice differently due to their distinct politics, but also 
Mexican-Americans who encountered police malpractice were 
 
 46. Id. at 139. 
 47. Id. at 140. 
 48. Id. at 141.  López provides many quoted excerpts from a 1972 legislative 
hearing where a former East L.A. sheriff’s deputy testified to the common 
practices of conducting arbitrary searches and seizures in East L.A. in contrast to 
the western portions of L.A.  The deputy also testified that it was common to 
engage in more physical violence with suspects in East L.A. and then arrest them 
for assaulting a police officer and no other crimes.  In addition, the deputy 
testified that police refused to provide essential response services to East L.A. in 
emergency situations (e.g., drug overdose, attempted suicide, serious injury 
involving a child, or a drowning child), by sending normal response radio cars to 
determine whether emergency equipment needed to be sent.  Id. at 141-46.  López 
asserts, in detail, that because minority activists were portrayed by Chief Parker 
and his successors not only as criminals but also as ideological enemies who 
supported communism, the police were given much more latitude to be aggressive 
while investigating Mexicans.  Id. at 146-51. 
 49. Id. at 152-53. 
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more likely to consider themselves Chicano.50 
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW CHICANO RACIAL IDENTITY 
In Part Three, López discusses the struggle of a very large 
group of people “to negotiate the tension between white and non-
white status.”51  He begins Part Three by providing historical 
information regarding Latino activism that formed the basis of the 
Chicano movement.  The activism description begins with a 
discussion of César Chávez’s farm workers movement, the land 
grant movement in New Mexico, and the Crusade for Justice (led 
by Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales, one of the East L.A. Thirteen 
defendants) that spoke to disenchanted urban Mexican youth.52  
According to the author, Gonzales was the first prominent activist 
to reclaim the name “Chicano,” formerly a pejorative term for low-
class Mexicans, now embracing a brown identity.53  López indicates 
that while the struggles of many contributed to Chicano activism, 
the black civil rights movement brought awareness of legal violence 
and had the biggest influence on the political mobilization of 
Chicanos.  He discusses which of the black civil rights movements’ 
tactics and organizing strategies were adopted by the Chicanos and 
notes the differing views within the Mexican community regarding 
the most effective strategies.54 
Second, López describes in detail how the school walkouts 
resulted in repression, led to a new focus on the “abusive and 
excessive prosecutorial power by an unrepresentative government,” 
and contributed to the rise of a non-white Chicano identity.55  
López asserts that Chicano activists developed this brown identity, 
and did not turn to “other potential bases of group solidarity such 
as class, nationality, or culture—because the social context made it 
‘obvious’ to them that Mexicans were yet another racial minority 
protesting social injustice and in turn encountering legal 
violence.”56  He explains that much of this occurred through the 
activities of the Brown Berets, and describes the formation and the 
 
 50. Id. at 153. 
 51. Id. at x. 
 52. Id. at 157-60. 
 53. Id. at 160. 
 54. Id. at 9, 161-64. 
 55. Id. at 10-12, 168-73. 
 56. Id. at 10. 
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evolution of the Brown Berets from a community service group, the 
Young Citizens for Community Action (YCCA), to a radical 
minority group.   
López asserts that while members of the Brown Berets were 
becoming somewhat more politically active, police brutality and 
harassment played a key role in causing the group to become more 
politicized.  He indicates that when things escalated, increased 
community militancy led to more police brutality, which then led 
to riots.57  López credits the Brown Berets with helping form the 
Chicano identity but notes that they did not come close to ending 
legal violence against Mexicans.  Eventually the Brown Berets 
became weakened when a number of women left the organization 
because the organization shifted its emphasis from community 
services to militancy.58   
López notes that the Chicano movement as a whole was based 
on masculine norms.  The movement sought to preserve traditional 
gender norms at home, to maintain the well-being of the race 
(emphasizing, literally and figuratively, that Mexican women were 
considered mothers of the race).  López argues that this was a 
failing by the Chicano movement.59 
López explains that when Mexicans were adopting a Chicano 
identity, Chicanos also practiced Common Sense Racism by 
rejecting whiteness within their own community, espousing dark 
looks as an ideal and rejecting Anglos.  For example, López notes, 
Mexican feminists were criticized as having become too white.60  He 
indicates that Chicanos initially considered themselves to have a 
black identity but then, because of too much discrimination against 
blacks, analogized their identity to that of Native Americans, 
linking their identity to an indigenous ancestry.  In doing so, they 
could lay a special claim to the Southwest and could assert a culture 
untainted by Anglo norms, focusing on the idea of nation as race.61 
López concludes his discussion of the formation of the 
Chicano movement by asserting that the Chicano movement 
adopted a mestizaje62 identity to create a cohesive political 
 
 57. Id. at 180-82, 189. 
 58. Id. at 200-02, 204. 
 59. Id. at 224-26. 
 60. Id. at 205-06, 208, 227-28. 
 61. Id. at 211-12. 
 62. The author defines “mestizaje” as “racial mixture.”  Id. at 218. 
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community.  Chicanos embraced a unified racial identity resulting 
from the gradual fusion of all people having mixed origins.63  He 
states that “the Chicano conception of mestizaje depended upon 
understanding race as a matter of descent,”64 but does not 
immediately state how this mixed-origins concept ties into his 
earlier argument that the Chicano movement depended on 
thinking about race as dependent on indigenous ancestry.  
However, López later asserts that for most Chicanos, a mestizaje 
identity was technically one emphasizing mixed origins, but 
functionally one of an indigenous ancestry.  He argues that when 
“Chicanos spoke of themselves as a mestizo people, they invoked 
not just physical difference but also a character, a culture, and a 
millennial identity rooted in race,”65 reinforcing the idea that race 
was biological and determined identity and history, and was, in 
essence, destiny.66  Thus, to contest the negative view of Mexicans, 
Chicanos promoted the idea of a mestizo race, emphasizing that 
race is “a matter of descent, not choice.”67  López concludes Part 
Three by arguing that this new race essentially was the same as the 
Anglo-constructed Mexican race; membership depended upon 
descent and was evidenced by skin color, and the Chicanos 
believed that members of the Mexican race were fundamentally the 
same as one another and distinct from members of other races.68 
V.  PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
In the epilogue, López recognizes “loose ends” that he 
proceeds to address.69  First, he notes that the Chicano social 
movement suffered a relatively quick demise as a result of the 
violence that had occurred, but asserts that it successfully changed 
the political scene for Mexicans by “creating space for the rise to 
elected and appointed positions of relatively more moderate 
 
 63. Id. at 200-20. 
 64. Id. at 220. 
 65. Id. at 222. 
 66. Id. at 220, 222-23. 
 67. Id. at 228. 
 68. Id. 
 69. One of López’s “loose ends” illustrates his desire to provide 
comprehensive historical information.  He indicates that Oscar Acosta 
campaigned for the position of L.A.  County Sheriff, quit the practice of law, 
became a somewhat violent activist, was rumored to have been running drugs, and 
disappeared in 1974.  Id. at 234-36. 
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Mexicans, usually members of the Mexican American generation.”70  
This assertion could be true.  The Los Angeles mayor in 2005, East 
L.A.-born Antonio Villaraigosa, ran for mayor twice and was elected 
in 2005 only after deemphasizing his Mexican heritage and 
pledging that he would be a mayor for all of L.A. despite his 
Mexican heritage.71  It seems that Mexicans who appear to be 
moderate are the most likely to be elected and appointed to 
important governmental positions.   
López also asserts that the Chicano movement unintentionally 
contributed to the development of feminism in the Mexican 
community.72  He indicates that despite these important 
contributions, he believes the principal legacy of the movement is 
the creation of, within a matter of months, a Chicano racial identity 
that affected not only the Mexican community but also society at 
large, by repudiating perceived characteristics of Mexicans.73 
Second, López argues that Mexicans are still not represented 
in California grand juries.  López cites statistics that show that 
Latinos made up six and one-half percent of the grand jurors in 
Los Angeles County in the 1990s, while they accounted for close to 
forty-one percent of the population.  He argues that situations like 
this are hard to remedy because “Equal Protection doctrine allows 
racist action that does not mention race but forbids race-conscious 
remedies designed to counteract racial inequality.”74  López wrote 
this before the U.S. Supreme Court issued Grutter v. Bollinger.75  In 
Grutter, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit a law school’s “narrowly tailored use of race in admissions 
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. . . .”76  
The Court said that whether an intentional, race-based action is 
permissible depends on the context of the situation—the specific 
compelling interest and the narrowly tailored remedy that cannot 
use race as a defining factor.77  While the holding does not address 
 
 70. Id. at 237. 
 71. Andrew Murr, The Survivor’s Story, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 2005, at 32, available 
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7937318/site/newsweek.  
 72. LÓPEZ, supra  note 1, at 238. 
 73. Id. at 1-2, 238-39. 
 74. Id. at 239, 241-42. 
 75. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 76. Id. at 307. 
 77. Id. at 332-36. 
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López’s concerns of counteracting racial inequality, the Court took 
a step in the direction of providing a means to further the objective 
of diversity. 
Third, the author notes that crime is a problem in every 
community, especially those “suffering from the negative effects of 
deindustrialization, segregation, and drastically diminished social 
services.”78  He cautions against using police in minority 
communities to carry out legal violence instead of providing 
necessary social and health services, based on a self-fulfilling idea of 
minority criminality flowing from Common Sense Racism.79 
Finally, López argues that while repudiating race may seem to 
be the best solution to our racial challenges, he believes that we are 
not currently ready to do so.  He asserts that those individuals 
considered non-white need to emphasize the issue of race in order 
to directly challenge and remake the common sense racial 
knowledge that “exists in the background, in our daily practices, 
our social structures, our understanding of what is normal, sane, 
and natural.”80  López concludes by asserting that “injustice creates 
races, especially where such injustice seems like common sense.”81 
This book provides an important narrative about the civil 
rights struggles faced by the largest minority group in the United 
States—a group which will soon outnumber all other minority 
groups combined.82  While López sometimes fails to explain where 
he is going with his discussion, he provides a very interesting and 
well-supported narrative of a struggle that should be included in 
broad discussions of the U.S. civil rights movement. 
 
 
 78. LÓPEZ, supra  note 1, at 247. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 249-50. 
 81. Id. at 250. 
 82. See id. at viii-ix (discussing the growth of the Latino/Hispanic 
population). 
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